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ABSTRACT 
 
A THEORETICAL OVERVIEW OF THE FIRST AND SECOND GENERATION 
MODELS OF CURRENCY CRISES 
Özbuğday, Fatih Cemil  
M.A., Department of Economics 
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Dr. Taner Yiğit 
 
May 2009 
 
 
 This study reckons a comprehensive and holistic overview of first and second 
generation models of currency crises. The main characteristics and assumptions of 
these models are portrayed and the motives behind these models are illustrated. By 
and large, the seminal papers which have been sources of inspiration for the 
evolution of the currency crisis theory are demonstrated in detail. Moreover, 
incorporations of various elements from economic theory into these models and 
extensions are discussed briefly. Finally, a very basic intuition about how successful 
these models are in giving explanations of currency crises that countries have 
experienced is given.  
 
 
Keywords: Currency Crises, Speculative Attacks 
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ÖZET 
 
BĐRĐNCĐ VE ĐKĐNCĐ NESĐL DÖVĐZ KRĐZĐ MODELLERĐNĐN TEORĐK AÇIDAN 
GENEL GÖRÜNÜMÜ 
Özbuğday, Fatih Cemil  
Mastır, Ekonomi Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Taner Yiğit 
 
Mayıs 2009 
 
 
 Bu çalışma birinci ve ikinci nesil döviz krizi modellerinin kapsamlı ve 
bütüncül bir görünümünü sunmaktadır. Bu modellerin temel özellikleri ve 
varsayımları betimlenmekte ve bu modellerin arkasındaki gerekçeler 
açıklanmaktadır. Genel olarak, döviz krizi teorisinin evrimine ilham kaynağı olmuş 
önemli makaleler ayrıntılı bir şekilde gösterilmektedir. Ayrıca, bu modellerin içinde 
bulundurulan ekonomi teorisinden gelen farklı unsurlar ve uzantıları kısaca 
tartışılmaktadır. Sonuçta, bu modellerin ülkelerin yaşadığı döviz krizlerini 
açıklamada ne kadar başarılı olduklarına ilişkin çok temel bir sezgi verilmektedir.  
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Döviz Krizleri, Spekülatif Ataklar 
                                        
v 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
ABSTRACT................................................................................................................iii 
ÖZET........................................................................................................................... iv 
TABLE OF CONTENTS............................................................................................. v 
LIST OF TABLES ...................................................................................................... vi 
LIST OF FIGURES ...................................................................................................vii 
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION................................................................................. 1 
CHAPTER II: FIRST GENERATION MODELS....................................................... 5 
2.1 An Example of First-Generation Model ............................................................ 7 
2.1.a Assumptions ................................................................................................ 7 
2.1.b The Sequels of the Model ........................................................................... 8 
2.2 General Discussion on First-Generation Models ............................................. 13 
CHAPTER III: SECOND-GENERATION MODELS.............................................. 16 
3.1 An Example of Second-Generation Model ...................................................... 17 
3.1.a Assumptions .............................................................................................. 18 
3.1.b The Sequels of the Model ......................................................................... 22 
3.2 The Second-Generation Models Examining the Interactions Among 
Speculators ............................................................................................................. 26 
3.3 Contagion Effects............................................................................................. 27 
3.4 General Discussion on Second-Generation Models......................................... 30 
CHAPTER IV: CONCLUSION ................................................................................ 34 
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY ...................................................................................... 36 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vi 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
 
1. The Breakdown of Currency Crises According to Their Causes and Country 
Origins between January  1970 and February 2002……………………...….32 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 
1. The Time Paths of Reserves, Domestic Credit, and the Money Supply during the 
Period Surrounding the Collapse………………………………………………..13 
 
2. The Circular Dynamic Potential for Currency Crises…………………………...18 
 
3. The Set of Equilibrium in Period 1……………………………………………...23 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
CHAPTER I  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
“The government is needy for even 70 cents.” 
Süleyman Demirel, the Prime Minister of Turkey, 1979  
 
Burnside et al. (2007: 1) define the currency crisis as an episode in which the 
exchange rate depreciates substantially during a short period of time. As Kaminsky 
(2006) reported 96 currency crises in 20 countries1 during the period from January 
1970 to February 2002, it is not surprising to see such an extensive literature on this 
topic. The main feature of this extensive literature is that it has a model-based 
approach. The models in this literature are often categorized as first-, second- which 
Jeanne (1999) calls also as “Escape Clause”, and third-generation.  
 
The first-generation models were mostly developed to explain the crises 
occurred in Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s (Kaminsky, 2006: 505). The 
common deduction of these models was that unsustainable fiscal policy caused the 
collapse of a fixed exchange rate regime. In other words, deterioration of the 
fundamentals resulting from inconsistent economic policies led to financial crises 
(Sbracia and Zaghini, 2001: 204). These models’ main focus was on the dynamics of 
                                                 
1
 Industrial countries: Denmark, Finland, Norway, Spain, Sweden; Developing countries: Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Indonesia, Israel, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, Thailand, 
Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela  
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speculative attacks against a currency at the root of which fundamental imbalances 
take place (Cavallari and Corsetti, 2000: 275-276). The classic first-generation 
models are those of Krugman (1979) and Flood and Garber (1984a). The former one 
was inspired by the main upshot of Henderson and Salant (1978) that attempts to 
restrict the price of any exhaustible resource by means of a buffer stock will 
inevitably result in a speculative attack. In Krugman’s (1979) setting, the exhaustible 
resource was the foreign currency whereas the buffer stock was the foreign exchange 
reserves held by the central bank in this context. In his highly simplified 
macroeconomic model, the key ingredients were the assumptions made concerning 
purchasing power parity (PPP), the government’s budget constraint, the money 
demand function, the post-crisis monetary policy and so on. However, due to 
nonlinearities involved in this model, Krugman was unable to derive an explicit 
solution for the collapse time in a fixed exchange rate regime. Later on Flood and 
Garber (1984a) came up with examples of linear models in which the time of the 
collapse could exactly be derived using a process of backwards induction (Agenor et. 
al., 1992: 358).   
 
The limitations of first generation models in explaining European Monetary 
System crisis of 1992-1993 and the 1994 Mexican peso crisis led researchers to 
reassess their thoughts on the causes of currency crises. Flood and Marion (1996) 
argue that many of the European countries, and later Mexico, were running 
disciplined macroeconomic policies when their currencies were attacked - which was 
contradictory to what first-generation models envisaged. So theorists proposed new 
models which were named “second-generation” models in order to explain the 
underlying causes of the crises mentioned above. The most-widely recognized works 
3 
 
 
of second-generation models of currency crises are Obstfeld (1986, 1994, 1996), 
Calvo (1995), Sachs, Tornell, Velasco (1996), Cole and Kehoe (1996), Bensaid and 
Jeanne (1997) and Drazen (1998) all of which were based on early work done by 
Flood and Garber (1984b). Esquivel and Larrain (1998) emphasizes that a common 
theme of these alternative models is their focus on the possibility of crises even in the 
absence of a continuous deterioration in economic fundamentals. The main 
assumptions of the second-generation models are that the government is an active 
agent that optimizes an objective function and a circular process which leads to 
multiple equilibria exists. Since pure expectations might bring about a switch 
between various equilibria, the second-generation models accept the possibility of 
self-fulfilling crises.  
 
What is more, in order to understand the nature of speculative attacks, another 
stream of second generation models most of which drew upon game theory arose. 
These models –which had different set ups and departed from each other- were 
chiefly examining the strategic interactions between speculators. The most famous 
examples of these models are Banerjee (1992), Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch 
(1992), Morris and Shin (1995) and Calvo and Mendoza (1997).  
 
Lastly, accompanied by the increased level of globalization, analysts began to 
contemplate on contagion effects. Various interdependences between countries were 
considered as one of the reasons underlying the currency crises which could not be 
explained by “bad” economic fundamentals. Gerlach and Smets (1995), Buiter et al. 
(1996), can be held as examples of this type of second generation currency crisis 
models.  
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The remainder of the paper goes as follows: Section II gives an overview of 
first-generation models and presents an illustration. Section III discusses about 
second-generation models and Obstfeld (1994)’s model is explained in detail. 
Finally, section IV concludes.  
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CHAPTER II  
 
 
FIRST GENERATION MODELS 
 
 
 
 
After the collapse of the Bretton Woods agreements in 1971, a number of 
currency crises emerged. In the end of the 1970s and during the following decade, 
most of these currency crises came about in Latin America. A new strand of models, 
which were labeled as first-generation models, was developed in order to capture the 
main features and spread of the above-mentioned currency crises.   
 
Developed in 1980s, these models echoed the prevalent views about currency 
crises for more than a decade. In his pioneering work, Krugman (1979) argued that 
when a continuous deterioration in the economic fundamentals turns out to be 
inconsistent with the policy of fixing the exchange rate, a currency crisis occurs. The 
above mentioned continuous deterioration is originated from the excessive creation 
of domestic credit so as to finance fiscal deficits. Basically, the model assumes that 
the government is restrained from accessing to capital markets; thence, it has to 
monetize its expenditures.  Burnside et al. (2007) elucidates this juncture in an 
intuitive way. In a fixed exchange rate regime a government must fix the money 
supply in conformity with the fixed exchange rate. This exigency acutely limits the 
government’s ability to raise seigniorage revenue. Besides, the government runs an 
enduring primary deficit. This deficit implies that the government must either deplete 
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foreign exchange reserves or borrow to finance the deficit. However, since the 
government faces a restriction about accessing to capital markets, it has to make use 
of its foreign exchange reserves-which is a constraint for the government, too and of 
which infinite use is impossible. Therefore, in the absence of financial reforms, the 
government must eventually finance the above mentioned deficit by printing money 
to raise seigniorage revenue which is inconsistent with keeping the exchange rate 
fixed. Consequently, it is predicted that the regime must eventually collapse.    
 
Speculators play a vital role in this set up. They attack against foreign 
exchange reserves in anticipation of capital gains, thereby predating the collapse of 
the fixed exchange rate regime. This attack always occurs before the central bank 
would have run out of reserves in the absence of speculation. By speculating against 
foreign currency, investors change their portfolio composition, cutting down the 
proportion of domestic currency and increasing the proportion of foreign currency.  
 
Generally speaking, the standard first-generation model combines a linear 
behavior rule by the private agents, namely the money demand function, with linear 
government behavior- domestic credit growth. All of this linearity interacts with the 
condition that perfectly foreseen profit opportunities are absent in equilibrium to 
generate a unique time for a foreseen possible speculative attack (Flood and Marion, 
1998: 14).  
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2.1 An Example of First-Generation Model 
 
In this section, a perfect-foresight, continuous time model by Flood and 
Garber (1984a) is presented. They construct a linear example in order to study the 
collapse time of a fixed exchange-rate regime. The model preserves essential 
elements of Krugman’s non-linear analysis. Furthermore, they invent a new concept- 
shadow floating exchange rate- in order to perform the analysis.  
 
 
2.1.1 Assumptions 
  
This is a small country model with purchasing power parity (PPP). It is 
assumed that agents have perfect foresight and that domestic residents can hold 
domestic money, domestic bonds, foreign money and foreign bonds as assets. The 
domestic government holds a stock of foreign currency in order to use in fixing the 
exchange rate. It is assumed that private domestic residents will hold no foreign 
money since it yields no monetary services. What is more, domestic and foreign 
bonds are perfect substitutes.  
 
The model is built around five equations: 
)()(
)(
10 tiaatP
tM
−= ,    (1) 
 
)()()( tDtRtM += ,   (2) 
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µ=)(tD& ,   0>µ ,   (3) 
 
)()()( * tStPtP = ,   (4) 
 
[ ])()()()( * tStStiti &+=  ,  (5) 
 
where P(t), M(t), and i(t) are the price level, domestic money stock and interest rate, 
respectively. D(t) and R(t) represent the domestic credit and domestic government 
book value of foreign money holdings, respectively. S(t) is the spot exchange rate, 
i.e. the domestic money price of foreign money. An asterisk (*) attached to a variable 
indicates “foreign”, and a dot over a variable (.) indicates the time derivative.  
 
Equation (1) represents the money market equilibrium condition. Equation (2) 
specifies that the money supply is equal to the book value of international reserves 
plus domestic credit. Equation (3) states that the domestic credit always grows at the 
positive constant rate µ. In other words, it grows monotonically over time and this 
growth is used to finance government expenditure. Equations (4) and (5) reflect 
purchasing power parity and uncovered interest parity, respectively.  
 
 
2.1.2 The Sequels of the Model 
 
In what follows, we use (4) and (5) to get: 
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)()()( tStStM &αβ −=    (6) 
 
where **1
*
0 iPaPa −≡β  and *1Pa=α . Both α and β are constants since they are 
linear combinations of the constants P* and i*.  
If the exchange rate is fixed at S , reserves will adjust to maintain money 
market equilibrium. The quantity of reserves at any time t is2 
 
)()( tDStR −= β ,   (7) 
 
If we take the time derivative of (7), we can compute the rate of change of 
reserves, i.e. the balance of payments deficit: 
 
µ−=−= )()( tDtR && ,   (8) 
 
Since there is a lower bound on net reserves and 0>µ , the fixed exchange 
rate regime cannot survive evermore due to exhaustion of finite reserve stock 
earmarked to support the fixed exchange rate. It is assumed that the government will 
support the fixed rate as long as its net reserves remain positive. After the fixed-rate 
regime has collapsed, the exchange rate floats freely evermore.  
 
The main problem in finding the collapse time is in connecting the fixed-
exchange rate regime to the post-collapse floating regime. The floating exchange rate 
                                                 
2
 We know that )()()( tStStM &αβ −= . )(tS& will be zero since the exchange rate is fixed. So 
)()()( tDtRStM +== β  )()( tDStR −= β  
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conditional on a collapse at an arbitrary time z, referred to as “shadow floating 
exchange rate” has to be determined.  
 
If the fixed exchange rate regime collapses at any time z, the government will 
have depleted its foreign currency reserve stock at z. That corresponds to the 
situation which left the Turkish Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel in despair as 
stated in the quotation in the very first part.  
 
Instantaneously, the post-attack money market equilibrium requires from 
Equation (6): 
 
)()()( +++ −= zSzSzM &αβ ,   (9) 
 
where +z points out the moment after attack. Beyond what has been said, 
)()( ++ = zDzM since 0)( =+zR , that is there are no reserves left. In addition to this, 
the government does not intervene in exchange markets under the new regime, thus 
exchange rate floats. In order to come up with floating exchange rate solution, the 
method of undetermined coefficients in the solution form of )()( 10 tMtS λλ += is 
used. Considering that µ== )()( tDtM && and substituting this trial solution into 
Equation (6), we find that 20 βαµλ = and βλ 11 = . Therefore, 
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ββ
αµ )()( 2
tM
tS += ,       zt ≥ . (10)3 
 
Since this is perfect-foresight model, agents can foresee the collapse. Firstly, 
suppose that agents expect a collapse at z and anticipate SzS >+ )( . The speculators 
attacking government reserves at time z will make an aggregate profit of an 
amount [ ] )()(
−+ − zRSzS , where −z is the moment just before the collapse. An 
individual speculator, foreseeing the attack at z, has incentives to forestall the other 
speculators by buying all the reserves prior to z. Hence, the attack will occur at an 
earlier moment.  
 
On the other hand, assume that agents expect an attack at time z and a 
currency appreciation, that is, [ ]SzS <+ )( . Then the speculators will accrue negative 
profits since [ ] 0)()( <−
−+ zRSzS . Thus, agents would have no incentive to attack 
against the government’s reserves and consequently the fixed exchange regime 
would survive.  
 
Referring to the reasoning above, we can conclude that at the moment of the 
anticipated attack it will be the case that SzS =+ )( . Using this condition, we can 
derive both the timing of the attack and the level of government reserve holdings at 
the time of the attack. If we substitute tDtD *)0()( µ+= for M(t) in Equation (10), 
                                                 
3
 From eq. (6) it follows that )()()( tStMtS &αβ += . If you take the time derivative of this 
expression you obtain: µβ == )()( tMtS && . Since βµ=)(tS&  ββ
αµ )()( 2
tM
tS +





=   
12 
 
 
we obtain the shadow floating exchange rate, which would materialize at the collapse 
time of the fixed exchange rate. After a little algebra we get: 
 
β
α
µβ
α
µ
β
−=−
−
=
)0()0( RDS
z .    (11)4 
 
Equation (11) justifies the intuitions as either a higher value of R(0), namely 
an increase in initial reserves, or a lower value of µ, which corresponds to a lower 
rate of domestic growth, delays the collapse. In the limiting case, as 0→µ the 
collapse is hindered indefinitely. However, either a lower R(0) or a higher µ 
expedites the collapse.  
 
In order to couple the domestic credit growth rate with the level of reserves 
prior to the collapse, we will refer to Equation (7): 
 
ββ
)()()()( −−
−−
+
=⇒=+
zDzRSSzDzR .  (12) 
 
Given equations (11), (12) and the expression zDzD µ+=
−
)0()( , we 
determine that  
βαµ=− )(zR  .  (13) 
 
                                                 
4
 β
µ
β
αµ tD
tS ++= )0()( 2 so 2)0( ββµβαµ SzD =++ . If we divide both sides by β we 
get βµβ
αµ SzD =++ )0( . We can obtain z from this expression. 
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Figure 1: The Time Paths of Reserves, Domestic Credit, and the Money Supply 
during the Period Surrounding the Collapse 
 
Source: Flood and Garber (1984a) 
 
In Figure 1, the time paths of reserves, domestic credit and the money supply 
during the period around the collapse are depicted. Money supply is constant prior to 
the collapse at z; however, its constituents alter. The domestic credit grows and the 
foreign exchange reserves fall at the rate µ. At time z, both money and reserves 
decrease by βαµ . Since there is no exchange reserve left, money equals domestic 
credit after z. Besides, µ)0(R  on the horizontal axis indicates the time when 
reserves would be depleted in the absence of a speculative attack.  
 
 
2.2 General Discussion on First-Generation Models 
 
In most first-generation models, the speculative attack is triggered by a 
monetary or fiscal policy which is inconsistent with the maintenance of the fixed 
currency peg. Thus, it is not difficult to diagnose the bad fundamental which is 
14 
 
 
simply a monetary or fiscal policy. Jeanne (1999) argues that one of the main 
contributions of the first-generation models was to show that the currency crises 
associated with the failure of stabilization plans of Latin American countries in the 
1970s and 1980s were the natural consequence of the monetary and fiscal policies 
implemented in these countries.  
 
Yet, these models suffered from some weaknesses. Eijffinger and Goderis 
(2007a) argue that the weaknesses of first-generation models became apparent after 
the crisis in the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1992-93, which was not 
characterized by structural government deficits or a gradual exhaustion of foreign 
reserves. Instead, governments had widened their exchange rate bands due to sudden 
speculative attacks on their currencies. Burnside et al. (2007) claims that a 
shortcoming of that type of first-generation model discussed above is the 
deterministic nature of the timing of the speculative attack. Obstfeld (1994) criticizes 
these models on that they ignored the policy options authorities can use. He 
concludes that since the actions of rational speculators must be stipulated on the 
endogenous reply of the authorities, these models give relatively little help when 
explaining the factors causing crises. Among the endogenous policy changes made 
by the government, for example, monetary policies such as interest rate decisions 
loom large. Eijffinger and Goderis (2007b) states that the conventional argument is 
that higher interest rates uphold exchange rates by discouraging capital outflows and 
increasing the costs of speculating against the currency of the crisis country.  
 
What is more, Agenor et al. (1992) argues that this early literature on balance 
of payments crises put too much emphasis on financial aspects thereby ignoring the 
15 
 
 
real events. However, the empirical evidence reveals that balance of payments crises 
are often associated with huge trade balance and current account movements around 
the crisis period.  
 
The lack of perfect access to international capital markets is another weakness 
of these types of models. In the presence of perfect access to international capital 
markets, the central bank can create foreign reserves by borrowing without violating 
the government’s intertemporal budget constraint. Thus, a regime collapse could be 
prevented indefinitely, at least in principle, thanks to such access to unlimited 
borrowing.   
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CHAPTER III 
 
 SECOND GENERATION MODELS 
 
 
 
The limitations of the first-generation models concerning the underlying 
causes of currency crises became much more apparent after the European Monetary 
System crises of 1992-93. The crises of EMS in 1992 and 1993 cannot be related to 
expansionary monetary policies since most of the European countries implemented 
strict and converging policies in accordance with Bundesbank in order to promote 
the single European currency. 
 
Jeanne (1999) claims that while countries such as Spain and Italy were 
running excessively expansionist monetary and fiscal policies, the others, like France 
and Great Britain, were clearly not. Accordingly, a number of authors have come up 
with alternative explanations of currency crises- called second-generation models. A 
common theme of these models is their focus on the possibility of crises even in the 
absence of a continuous deterioration in economic fundamentals (Ezquivel and 
Larrain, 1998: 3). 
 
17 
 
 
In second-generation models, the government optimizes an explicit objective 
function. This optimization problem is regarding when policies run by the 
government respond to changes in private behavior or when the government faces a 
trade-off between fixing the exchange rate and other alternative policies. The above 
mentioned optimization problem yields nonlinear behaviors by government which 
bring about multiple equilibria. Since pure expectations cause a switch between these 
equilibria, many of second-generation models accept the possibility of self-fulfilling 
crises. A typical example can be in the following form: when the swerve pessimism 
of a large group of investors stimulates a capital outflow, it leads to the collapse of 
the exchange rate system, thus validating the negative expectations. Ezquivel and 
Larrain (1998) suggest that these models underline the role of expectations by taking 
into account the strategic complementarities of the actions of economic agents in 
determining the ultimate effect.  
 
 Among extensions of second-generation models, game-theoretic approach 
such as herd behavior looms large so as to unfold expectations and speculative 
attacks. Besides, in order to unveil the currency crises triggered by interdependencies 
between countries, the models including contagion effects were proposed.  
 
 
3.1 An Example of Second-Generation Model 
 
In his expository work, Obstfeld (1994) states that speculative anticipations 
hinge on conjectured government responses, which depend, in turn, on how price 
changes that are themselves kindled by expectations that affect the government’s 
18 
 
 
economic and political positions. He concludes that this circular dynamic implies a 
potential for crises that need not have occurred, but that do occur since market 
participants anticipate them to. Below, his model about the role of nominal interest 
rates is presented in detail.  
 
 
 
Figure 2: The Circular Dynamic Potential for Currency Crises  
 
 
 
3.1.1 Assumptions 
 
In this set up, the world lasts for two periods, denoted 1 and 2. We will 
consider the position of a government that issues a domestic currency unit (lira in 
this set up) but also involves in foreign currency (the mark) market. The government 
enters period 1 with obligations to pay claimants the nonnegative amounts 10 D  lira in 
period 1 and 20 D lira in period 2. Likewise, in period 1 the government receives 
payments of 10 f marks in period 1 and 20 f marks in period 2. The real government 
 
 
Price changes  
 
Speculative anticipation 
Expectations that affect 
the government’s 
economic and political 
positions 
 
Conjectured government 
response 
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consumption in the two periods, 1g and 2g , are given exogenously. Lastly, the 
government can levy taxes on output at rate τ to balance its budget, but only in 
period 2.  
 
The assumptions of purchasing power parity and PE = are employed. In 
period 1, the lira/mark exchange rate is fixed at 1E , however, in period 2 the rate may 
be changed to 2E . The letter i denotes the nominal interest rate on loans made in 
period 1 and repaid in period 2. The new lira obligations due in period 2 incurred by 
the government in period 1 are denoted by 21 D . Then the period 1 constraint is: 
 






+
+−++=
*
211
101111021 1
)()()1(
i
fEfEgEDiD ,   (14)5 
 
In period 2, the government must meet all obligations and additionally it 
should spend 22 gE lira. The revenue to finance these obligations is generated from 
mark assets, taxes on domestic output y, and any increase in the amount of (high-
powered) money residents wish to hold in period 2, 2M , over the amount held in 
period 1, 1M . Thus, the implied period 2 constraint is: 
 
[ ] 12222202122021 MMyEgEffEDD −+=++−+ τ ,   (15) 
 
                                                 
5
 New lira obligations due in period 2 = (1+interest rate)*(lira debt service + government consumption 
expenditure + acquisition of new mark assets – mark receipts that accrue in period 1) 
20 
 
 
Under the capital mobility and uncovered interest-rate parity assumptions, 
perfect-foresight equilibrium requires the ex-post equality of lira and mark asset 
returns, measured in lira, 
 
)1(1 *
1
2 i
E
Ei +=+ .   (16) 
 
Equations (14), (15) and (16) can be combined to yield the government’s 
intertemporal budget constraint which is expressed in lira: 
 
i
MMygEgE
i
DfEDfE
+
−−−
+=
+
−
+−
1
)(
1
)()( 1222112020210101
τ
.   (17) 
 
On the other hand, private money demand obeys the very basic quantity 
equation: 
 
ykEM tt =   [ ]2,1=t ,  (18)  
 
where real output is assumed to be constant. 
 
Subsequently, the government is concerned about the distorting effects of (ex-
post) inflation and the tax rate. Due to the fact that these variables are zero in period 
1 by assumption, the quadratic loss function the government minimizes can be 
written as: 
 
21 
 
 
22
22
1
ε
θ
τ +=L ,   (19) 
 
where ε is the depreciation rate of lira against the mark (the inflation rate of lira 
prices) between periods 1 and 2: 
 
2
12
E
EE −
=ε    (20) 
 
We can combine Equations (14) and (15) in order to clarify the fiscal role of 
the depreciation rateε . This yields:  
 
2021220212021 )( ffgddykydd −−++=+++ τε ,   (21) 
 
where 





+
+−++=
*
21
1011021 1
)1(
i
ffgdid and the symbol st d denote the real value at 
the period 1 price level of the lira government debt payment promised on date t for 
date s>t.  
 
Equation (21) states that in the second period, the revenues of the inflation 
levy plus conventional taxes must be sufficient to repay the government’s net debt 
and pay for current spending. 
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3.1.2 The Sequels of the Model 
 
In period 2, the government chooses ε and τ to minimize its quadratic loss 
function subject to Equation (21). Momentously, all variables in (21) are 
predetermined exceptε andτ . On the other side, the private sector has rational 
expectations regarding the objectives of the government. Besides, the forecast of lira 
depreciation incorporated in the nominal interest rate i is based on the assumption 
that the government will act in this way.  
 
τε ,
Min  22
22
1
ε
θ
τ +=L subject to 2021220212021 )( ffgddykydd −−++=+++ τε . 
 
If we write the Lagrangian and find the first order conditions: 
 
[ ]202122021202122 22
1 ffgddykyddL ++−−−+++−+= τεεελεθτ , 
 
y
yyL τλλτλτ
τ
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∂
∂ 0 , 
 
[ ]kyddkyddL ++=→=−−−=
∂
∂
20212021 0 λθελλλθεε , 
 
ykydd
τθε
=
++ 2021
.   (22) 
 
Using (22) to eliminate τ from (21) givesε as: 
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Remembering 





+
+−++=
*
21
1011021 1
)1(
i
ffgdid and substituting it in the 
equation above shows how the government’s preferred depreciation rate is 
influenced by the market interest rate effective in period 1 and by the currency 
composition government chooses for its debt.  
 
 
Figure 3: The Set of Equilibrium in Period 1 
 
Source: Obstfeld (1994) 
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On the vertical axis of Figure 3, we have the depreciation reaction function of 
the government showing the depreciation rate ε it adopts in period 2 when faced with 
a lira interest rate of i . It is assumed that the reaction function is positively sloped, 
which reflects, intuitively, that the possibility that a higher nominal 1 interest rate 
makes greater currency depreciation optimal by raising the inflation tax base in 
period 2. At the same time, we have another upward-sloping curve, the interest parity 
curve, demonstrating the expected rate of depreciation consistent with the lira 
interest rate prevailing in period 1. The derivation of the interest parity curve goes as 
follows: if we combine Equations (16) and (20) it follows that 
i
ii
+
−
=
1
*
ε which can 
be seen as the reaction function of the lira bond market, namely, the interest rate it 
sets based on its expectations ofε .  
 
In a perfect-foresight equilibrium, given market expectations, the depreciation 
rate which government finds optimal should be equal to the depreciation rate the 
market expects. Hence, intersection of the interest parity curve and the government 
reaction function determines the possible equilibria of currency depreciation and 
nominal interest rates. In Figure 2, there are two equilibria6. Clearly, the 
government’s loss is lower in the low-depreciation equilibrium ( )11 ,εi , but it is not 
guaranteed that the bond market coordinates on low lira interest rate. Here the 
government confronts with a dynamic inconsistency problem: it cannot make 
credible promises regarding not validating the expectations if the bond market agrees 
on the high-inflation equilibrium’s interest rate.  
 
                                                 
6
 It is obtained by setting 1=y , 0.110 =d , 2.020 =d , 010 =f , 020 =f , 021 =f , 
35.021 == gg and  05.0* =i  
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Now let us consider the implications of the analysis above for a fixed 
exchange rate regime. A government always can relinquish a currency peg if 
economic conditions allow a realignment. Assume, nevertheless, that the government 
faces a cost c 7of realigning. In this case the loss function is: 
 
cZL ++= 22
22
1
ε
θ
τ      { }00,01 =↔=≠↔= εε ZZ .   (23) 
 
If the superfluous loss of a fixed exchange rate regime is greater than c , the 
government will find it optimal to devalue.  
 
Suppose the market expects the currency to be devalued at the rate 2ε and sets 
the nominal interest rate at the corresponding level 2i  as shown in Figure 3. Then the 
government will be induced to exercise the anticipated devaluation regardless of the 
realignment cost c . This is an example of a self-fulfilling speculative attack: there 
exists an equilibrium in which the exchange parity can survive, however, the 
government is led to change the parity since private expectations make it too costly 
not to.  
 
Obstfeld (1994) asserts that this model captures aspects of the Italian crisis in 
September 1992, when the government was forced to hinge heavily on Bank of Italy 
in order to finance its high cash-flow requirements. Besides, the model applies to 
other situations such as Britain’s in the 1950s and 1960s, when the authorities strived 
to prevent the collapse of the value of the pound against a large and increasing public 
debt.    
                                                 
7
 This may be a cost that could reflect political embarrassment and credibility loss.  
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3.2 The Second-Generation Models Examining the Interactions Among 
Speculators 
 
 It is not surprising to see the elements of game theory in explaining the 
interactions among speculators since this analysis focuses mainly on human 
behavior. In this context, an explanation for the onset of a currency attack is 
information cascades. The cascades story hinges on actual observations of others’ 
actions. In this sense, Banerjee (1992) develops a model in which paying attention to 
what everyone else is doing is rational because their decisions may reflect 
information that they have and the others do not. It then comes out that a possible 
outcome of  people trying to use this information is what we call herd behavior- 
everyone doing what everyone else is doing, even in the existence of private 
information which requires doing something different.  
  
 Flood and Marion (1998) comes up with a concrete example: Suppose each 
speculator has some information about the state of the economy and decides 
sequentially and publicly whether to hold the currency or sell it. If the first n 
investors receive bad signals regarding the state of the economy and sell the 
currency, then the (n+1)th investor may choose to ignore his own information even if 
it suggests that the fixed exchange rate can survive. Accordingly, he sells based on 
the revealed information of those who came before him. This sequential decision rule 
eventuates in herd behavior. In conclusion, if some traders begin selling the currency, 
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others will partake in the herd, moving the economy from the no-attack to the attack 
equilibrium. 
 
 However, a pure cascades story may not capture the driving forces of 
currency attacks. Firstly, as Lee (1993) has discussed, the cascade argument hinges 
on a discrete action space so that individuals totally ignore their own information. 
Nonetheless, it can be the case, as in Morris and Shin (1995)’s model, that traders 
can vary their strategies continuously and so can adjust their strategies to new 
information. What is more, if the potential gains resulting from the action of one 
agent do not depend on the actions chosen by others, then it may be unsatisfactory to 
rely on cascades argument.  
 
 
3.3 Contagion Effects 
 
 Calvo and Mendoza (2000) defines the contagion as a situation in which 
utility-maximizing investors choose not to pay for information that would be relevant 
for their portfolio decision or in which investors optimally choose to mimic arbitrary 
“market” portfolios. Their view reflects rather the herding behavior argument. Their 
earlier work on a global scale provides a contagion example which is based on 
herding behavior. Calvo and Mendoza (1997) deviate from the sequential decision-
making framework and think of a global market where many identical investors 
formulate their decisions simultaneously. They show that under informational 
frictions, herding behavior may become more predominant as the world capital 
market grows. Because globalization lessens the motives to collect country-specific 
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information and raises the probability that fund managers who are concerned about 
their performances will select the very same investment portfolio. Accordingly, small 
hearsays may result in herding behavior and move the economy from the no-attack to 
the attack equilibrium.   
 
 A similar analysis based on informational issues can be found also in Caplin 
and Leahy (1994). In their model, financial market participants anticipate a crisis but 
they hold different beliefs regarding its timing. It is costly for investors to take 
position prior to crisis. Each investor is uncertain whether other investors share his or 
her belief on the occurrence of crisis. They exchange “cheap talk” amongst 
themselves but make inferences only by observing the market. The outcome is 
normal market conditions with no clues of crisis until it abruptly breaks out. Once it 
happens, nevertheless, market actors claim that they knew that the crisis was about to 
occur and they were readying themselves for the consequences (wisdom after the 
fact). Eichengreen et al. (1996) argues that an illustrative application of this model 
would be to the ERM crises of 1992-93. The story goes as follows: There was a 
popular belief that ERM could not continue to operate indefinitely without a 
realignment. However, its extraordinary stability since January 1987 led investors to 
accept the view that the system could now work without further realignments. Other 
circumstances such as the political difficulties of ratifying the Maastricht Treaty then 
initiated a crisis (which resulted in the devaluation of the Italian lira) which abated 
this belief. It came out to all investors that what they privately thought was correct- 
that the realignments were still necessary.  
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On the other hand, Fratzscher (2002) looks from a different perspective and 
suggests another definition. According to him, contagion is the transmission of a 
crisis to a particular country due to its real and financial interdependence with 
countries that are already experiencing a crisis.  
 
The examples of crisis transmission via real interdependence can be found in 
Eichengreen et al.  (1996). They reveal that the attack on the U.K. in September 1992 
and the sterling’s subsequent depreciation are reported to have damaged the 
international competitiveness of the Republic of Ireland, for which the U.K. is the 
most important export market and to have triggered the attack on the punt at the 
beginning of 1993. Finland’s devaluation in August 1992 was widely considered as 
having had negative implications for Sweden, not because of direct trade linkages 
between the two countries but because of their exporters’ competition in the same 
third markets. Attacks on Spain in 1992-1993 and the depreciation of the peseta are 
said to have detrimental effects on the international competitiveness of Portugal, 
which relies heavily on the Spanish export market and to have stimulated an attack 
on the escudo in spite of the absence of imbalances in domestic fundamentals.  
 
The first scientific theoretical explanations for the real interdependence 
argument can be found in Gerlach and Smets (1995). They consider two countries 
linked by trade in manufactures and financial assets. In their model, a successful 
attack on one exchange rate leads to its real depreciation, which improves the 
competitiveness of the country’s merchandise exports. This generates a trade deficit 
in the second country, thereby a gradual decrease in its central bank’s international 
reserves. Finally, it causes an attack on its currency.  
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 On the other hand, financial interdependence can be a channel for 
transmitting the crisis into another economy, too. Buiter et al. (1996) develops a 
model in order to analyze the spread of currency crises in a system of N+1 countries, 
N of which (periphery) peg their currencies to the remaining country’s (center). The 
center is assumed to be more risk averse than the others and is therefore reluctant to 
follow a cooperative monetary policy formulated to stabilize exchange rates. If a 
negative shock to the center causing interest rates to go up occurs, then the members 
of the periphery will find it optimal to leave the system8 as long as they cooperate. 
However, if some subset of peripheral countries with the least tolerance for high 
interest rates finds it optimal to leave the system, then contagion will be limited to 
this subset.  
 
 
3.4 General Discussion on Second-Generation Models 
 
Jeanne (1999) claims that the first contribution of the second-generation 
models is that it led researchers to rethink about the notion of fundamentals. He 
asserts that the notion of fundamental is much broader in scope than in first 
generation models. Besides, he makes a categorization among fundamentals: “hard” 
observable fundamentals such as unemployment or the trade balance and “soft” 
fundamentals such as the beliefs of the foreign exchange market players. Moreover, 
he suggests that the second contribution of the second generation models is that it 
provides a new theory of self-fulfilling speculation and multiple equilibria.  
                                                 
8
 This is the extreme case of contagion. 
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In this context, we can say that the second-generation models show that the 
self-fulfilling and “fundamentalist” views are not mutually exclusive. For a currency 
to be exposed to an attack, the fundamentals must first signal a state of weakness. 
However, in second-generation models the occurrence and exact timing of a crisis 
may be inestimable merely based on fundamentals.  
  
Beyond what has been said, Flood and Marion (1998) compares the first-and 
second- generation models of currency crises. They suggest that most of the 
differences between these two models can be traced to one crucial assumption: first-
generation models assume the commitment to a fixed exchange rate is state invariant 
while second-generation models allow it to be state dependent. They argue that the 
government’s commitment to the fixed exchange rate is often constrained by factors 
such as unemployment, the size of the public debt or upcoming elections. Taking into 
account that these factors influence the government’s commitment to the fixed 
exchange rate is a major contribution of the second-generation models.  
 
In order to overcome the shortfalls of the first- and second-generation models, 
Kaminsky (2006)’s work provide us important starting points. She examines 
currency crises experienced in a variety of countries during the period from January 
1970 to February 2002. Her results are summarized in Table 1: 
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Table 1: The Breakdown of Currency Crises According to Their Causes and 
Country Origins between January 1970 and February 2002 
 
Crises in emerging and mature markets 
Countries Number of crises (in percent) 
 Current 
Account 
Financial 
Excesses 
Fiscal 
Deficits 
Sovereign 
Debt 
Sudden 
Stops 
Self-
fulfilling 
Emerging        13        35        6        45        2        0 
Mature        17        13        4        33        17        17 
 
Source: Kaminsky (2006) 
 
According to the results, the causes of the crises differ across emerging and 
mature economies. Current account and competitiveness problems are more 
associated with mature markets (17% of the crises) than that of emerging economies 
(13% of the crises).These problems indicate the failure of first generation models. 
We can explain these kinds of currency crises using second-generation currency 
crises models focusing on real-interdependence between countries.  
 
Moreover, 86% of the crises in emerging economies are crises with multiple 
domestic vulnerabilities such as financial excesses, fiscal deficits and sovereign debt 
problems while economic fragility only characterizes 50% of the crises in mature 
markets. This simply implies that first-generation models are somewhat successful in 
explaining crises in emerging economies with a large number of vulnerabilities.  
 
Sudden-stop problems which are characterized by adverse shocks to 
international capital markets and cannot be foreseen by first-generation models are 
also more common in mature markets (17% of all crises) than in emerging markets 
(2% of all crises). In this context, second-generation models are more successful.  
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Finally, while most of the crises are related to real, financial, or external 
vulnerabilities, a small number of crises are unrelated to deteriorating fundamentals, 
namely self-fulfilling crises, which is the main point of the second-generation 
models. These crises are not a feature of emerging markets but tend to occur in 
mature markets.  
 
We can simply suggest that second-generation models bring more sound 
explanations in order to analyze crises in mature economies.  
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CHAPTER IV  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
Referring to the quotation in the very first part, it can be suggested that the 
currency crises will be on researchers’ agenda for a long time due to its drastic 
implications for governments and economies. As economies evolve and transform 
themselves, new streams of currency crises models will emerge.  
 
This paper has focused on the first- and second-generation models of 
currency crises. Moreover, two examples from each stream of models have been 
demonstrated in detail. The first-generation models deduce that unsustainable fiscal 
policy causes the collapse of a fixed exchange rate regime. In other words, 
deterioration of the fundamentals resulting from inconsistent economic policies leads 
to financial crises.  
 
Moreover, after EMS crisis in 1992-93 second-generation models the 
assumptions of which were that the government is an active agent that optimizes an 
objective function and a circular process which leads to multiple equilibria exists 
were developed. Since pure expectations might bring about a switch between various 
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equilibria, the second-generation models accepted the possibility of self-fulfilling 
crises.  
 
However, Eijffinger and Goderis (2007a) suggest that although first- and 
second-generation models have done reasonably well in explaining many past crises, 
they do not bring sound explanations on order to understand the crisis in East Asia 
1997–98. They argue that these countries did not go through any first-generation-like 
fiscal problems and nor did they counter the policy trade-off, as some EMS crisis 
countries did during 1992-93 period. Therefore, new models were needed and the 
first attempts to develop such models focused on problems in the banking sector 
which later emerged as a new strand of literature. This literature, sometimes referred 
to as ‘third-generation literature’, emphasized the importance of balance sheet 
vulnerabilities and international capital flows.  
 
As a concluding word, it can be proposed that these two models capture 
different aspects of currency crises and they provide systematic theoretical treatment 
of currency crises even though they have a number of shortcomings.   
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